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Abstract
By the age of 5, children explicitly represent that agents can have both true and false 
beliefs based on epistemic access to information (e.g., Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 
2001). Children also begin to understand that agents can view identical evidence and 
drawdifferentinferencesfromit(e.g.,Carpendale&Chandler,1996).However,much
less is known about when, and under what conditions, children expect other agents to 
change theirminds.Here, inspiredby formal idealobservermodelsof learning,we
investigate children’s expectations of the dynamics that underlie third parties’ belief 
revision. We introduce an agent who has prior beliefs about the location of a popula-
tion of toys and then observes evidence that, from an ideal observer perspective, 
either does, or does not justify revising those beliefs. We show that children’s infer-
ences on behalf of third parties are consistent with the ideal observer perspective, but 
not with a number of alternative possibilities, including that children expect other 
agents to be influenced only by their prior beliefs, only by the sampling process, or 
only by the observed data. Rather, children integrate all three factors in determining 
how and when agents will update their beliefs from evidence.
RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS
• Understanding the conditions under which other agents will change 
their minds is a key component of social cognition.
• Considerable evidence suggests that children themselves learn 
 rationally from data: integrating evidence with their prior beliefs.
• Do 4- to 6-year-olds expect other agents to learn rationally?
Can they use others’ prior beliefs and data to predict when third 
parties will retain their beliefs and when they will change their 
minds?
• Hereweuseacomputationalmodelofrationallearningtomotivate
predictions for an ideal observer account, as well as five alternative 
accounts. We found that children expect third parties to be rational 
learners with respect to their own prior beliefs.
• The data were not consistent with alternative accounts. In particu-
lar, children did not expect others simply to retain their own prior 
beliefs, learn from the data without integrating it with their prior 
beliefs, or share the children’s beliefs. Rather, children expected 
agents to learn normatively from evidence.
1  | INTRODUCTION
Expectations of rational agency support our ability to predict other 
people’sactionsandinfertheirmentalstates(Dennett,1987;Fodor,
1987).Adultsassume thatagentswill takeefficient routes towards
theirgoals(D’Andrade,1987;Heider,1958),andstudieswithinfants
suggest that these expectations emerge very early in development 
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(Skerry, Carey, & Spelke, 2013). By the end of the first year, infants 
can use situational constraints, along with knowledge about an agent’s 
goal, to predict an agent’s actions. Similarly, they use knowledge of an 
agent’s actions and situational constraints to infer the agent’s goal, as 
well as knowledge of an agent’s actions and goal to infer unobserved 
situational constraints (Csibra, Bíró, Koós, & Gergely, 2003; Gergely & 
Csibra,2003;Gergely,Nádasdy,Csibra,&Bíró,1995).Suchworkhas
inspired computational models of theory of mind that formalize the 
principle of rational action and successfully predict human judgments 
(Baker,Saxe,&Tenenbaum,2009;Baker,Saxe,&Tenenbaum,2011;
Jara-Ettinger, Baker, & Tenenbaum, 2012). Here however, we ask
whether learners’ expectations extend to the more colloquial meaning 
of the word ‘rational’: the expectation that other people’s judgments 
and beliefs have a basis in the evidence they observe.
Note that this is distinct from the question ofwhether children
themselves draw rational inferences from data. Decades of research 
suggest that very young children can integrate prior beliefs with small 
samples of evidence to infer the extensions of word meanings, identify 
object categories, learn causal relationships, and reason about others’ 
goal-directedactions(seeGopnik&Wellman,2012;Schulz,2012;and
Tenenbaum,Kemp,Griffiths,&Goodman,2011,forreviews).However,
despite extensive work on children’s theory of mind (see Wellman, 
2014, for discussion and review), less is known about how children
expectotherstolearnfromevidence.Althoughclassictheoryofmind
tasks look at whether children expect others to update their beliefs 
given diverse forms of epistemic access to data – including direct 
perceptualaccess(e.g.,Wimmer&Perner,1983), indirectclues(e.g.,
Sodian,Taylor,Harris,&Perner, 1991) and testimony (e.g., Zaitchik,
1991)– these involvea relatively simple instantiationof theexpec-
tation that others will learn based on their observations of the world: 
children need only understand whether the agent does, or does not, 
haveepistemicaccesstobelief-relevantinformation.Suchstudiesdo
not ask whether children understand that agents might evaluate evi-
dence differently or draw different inferences from identical evidence.
The studies that do look at children’s understanding of how third 
parties might evaluate evidence suggest that an ‘interpretative theory 
ofmind’isarelativelylatedevelopment(Astington,Pelletier,&Homer,
2002;Carey& Smith, 1993;Chandler&Carpendale, 1998; LaLonde
&Chandler,2002;Myers&Liben,2012;Pillow&Mash,1999;Ross,
Recchia, & Carpendale, 2005; Ruffman, Perner, Olson, & Doherty,
1993).Notuntil6and7yearsdochildrenunderstand,forexample,that
an ambiguous line drawing can be viewed as two different kinds of ani-
mals(Carpendale&Chandler,1996)orthaticonicsymbolsaresubject
to different interpretations (Myers & Liben, 2012). Young children’s fail-
ure to understand that agents can reach different conclusions from the 
same evidence suggests that children might have difficulty understand-
ing how other agents’ prior knowledge affects the interpretation of data.
Arguably,however,understandingthatevidenceisambiguousand
thus open to interpretation may be more challenging than understand-
ing the conditions under which others might be expected to learn from 
evidence. Relatively little work has looked at what children understand 
about others’ inferences from data, and the findings here are mixed. 
Forinstance,both4-and6-year-oldsrecognizethatanunseenmarble
must be blue if it is drawn from a bag containing only blue marbles; 
however,only6-year-oldsrecognizethatathirdparty(whoknowsthe
contents of the bag) will make the same inference and thus know the 
colorofthemarble(Sodian&Wimmer,1987).However,4-year-olds
do understand that if covariation evidence suggests that one of two 
causes is correlated with an outcome and the experimenter tricks a 
puppet by reversing the evidence, the puppet will conclude that the 
wrongvariableisthecause(Ruffmanetal.,1993).
Suchstudiessuggest thatby4,childrenareat leastbeginning to
understand that third parties learn from evidence in ways that go beyond 
mereperceptualaccesstodata.However,theyleaveopenthequestion
of whether children can use patterns of evidence to understand when 
others will change their minds, and the degree to which children inte-
grate others’ prior beliefs in predicting their learning. Do children expect 
others to update their beliefs from data in cases where learning requires 
representing not merely an agent’s access to evidence but the agent’s 
abilitytodrawappropriateinferencesfromtheevidence?
To ask whether children expect others to rationally update their 
beliefs from data we borrow from two influential tasks in the litera-
ture.Thefirstistheclassicfalsebelieftask(Wimmer&Perner,1983).
The other is derived from work looking at infants’ and children’s under-
standing of the relationship between samples and populations (e.g., 
Denison&Xu,2014;Gweon,Tenenbaum,&Schulz, 2010;Kushnir,
Xu, & Wellman, 2010; Xu & Denison, 2009; Xu & Garcia, 2008).
Specifically, we show a child and another agent (a Frog puppet) two 
boxes: one containingmore rubber ducks thanping-pongballs (the
Duck box) and one containing more balls than ducks (the Ball box). 
The Frog leaves, and the child watches as the boxes are either moved 
and returned to the same location (so the Frog has a true belief about 
the location of each box) or switched (so the Frog has a false belief 
aboutthelocationofeachbox).Attest,theFrogreturns,andboththe
child and the Frog watch as the experimenter reaches into the Duck 
box and draws a sample of three or five ducks either apparently at 
random (without looking into the box) or selectively (looking in and 
fishingaround).AfterboththechildandtheFrogseethesampleof
data, children are asked, ‘Where does Froggy think the Duck box is 
now?’SeeFigure1foraschematicoftheprocedure.
Both the ability to reason about others’ false beliefs (see Baillargeon, 
Scott,&He,2010) and theability to recognizewhendata are sam-
pledrandomlyorselectively (e.g.,Xu&Denison,2009)emergerela-
tivelyearlyindevelopment.However,childrendonotreliablyprovide
accurate responses in explicit false belief tasks until later childhood 
(see Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001, for review) and as noted, the 
ability to understand that identical evidence can be open to different 
interpretationsemergesevenlater(e.g.,Astingtonetal.,2002;Carey
&Smith, 1993,Chandler&Carpendale, 1998; LaLonde&Chandler,
2002;Myers&Liben,2012;Pillow&Mash,1999;Rossetal,2005;
Ruffmanetal.,1993).Becauseweareinterestednotinchildren’sown
inferences from the data, but in their inferences on behalf of a third 
party whose beliefs may differ both from the child’s own and those 
supportedbytheobserveddata,herewefocuson4.5-to6-year-olds.
As shown in Table1, if children expect the Frog to update his
beliefs from evidence, then the cross between old and new locations 
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F IGURE  1 Schematicoftheprocedure.InthePreferencephase(a)childrenareshownthetwoboxeswithdifferentproportionsofducks
and balls and asked to identify the Duck box and Ball box based on each box’s majority object. Then children are introduced to the Frog puppet 
and his preference for ducks and the Duck box and then learn, along with the Frog, that the boxes can either each move back and forth to stay 
inthesamelocationormovefromonesidetotheothertoswitchlocations.IntheBeliefPhase(b)childreneitherseetheboxesswitchlocations
(NewLocationcondition)orstayinthesamelocation(OldLocationcondition)whiletheFrogisabsent.WhentheFrogreturns,hewilleither
haveafalsebeliefaboutthelocationoftheDuckbox(NewLocationcondition)oratruebeliefaboutthelocationoftheDuckbox(OldLocation
condition). Children are asked two check questions to confirm that they have tracked the locations of the boxes and the Frog’s belief at the end 
oftheBeliefPhase.IntheSamplingPhase(c)theFrogreturnsandtheexperimentersampleseitherrandomly(RandomSamplingcondition)or
selectively(SelectiveSamplingcondition)fromthehiddenDuckbox.AttheTestPhasechildrenareaskedwheretheFrogthinkstheDuckboxis
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and random and selective sampling predicts a pattern of responses 
distinct from the pattern that would be generated if children adopted 
many other possible response strategies. We will walk through the 
predictions of our account intuitively; however, to clarify our proposal, 
we also include a computational model providing quantitative pre-
dictions for both our account and a number of alternatives, in each 
experimentalcondition(seeFigure4andAppendixS1).Thedetailsof
the model are not critical to our proposal as our goal here is not to 
evaluate the Rational Learning model per se. Given that there are only 
five conditions, and some of them (e.g., both selective sampling condi-
tions) make overlapping predictions, correlations between the model 
and children’s performance may be less convincing than the relative fit 
of the Rational Learning model in comparison to the alternative mod-
els. That is the analysis we include here. In addition, it is helpful to 
consider the qualitative intuitions behind these models insofar as they 
motivate our predictions and ground our intuitions in a precise state-
ment of what constitutes ‘rational inference’ in this context.
1.1 | Predictions of the rational inference account
If children expect agents to rationally update their beliefs, they should 
respond jointly to the type of sampling process and the Frog’s prior 
beliefs about the boxes’ locations together with his knowledge that 
theboxescanmove.Asamplerandomlydrawnfromapopulation is
likely to be representative of the population. Thus we predict that in 
the Random Sampling conditions, children should expect the Frog to 
use the evidence to verify or update his beliefs about the location of 
the Duck box.
Specifically, randomly sampling three ducks in a row is improbable 
unless the evidence is sampled from the Duck box. Thus when evi-
dence is randomly sampled from the Old Location (OL/RS), children 
should infer that the Frog will retain his belief and will continue to 
think that theDuckbox is in theOld location.However,whenevi-
dence is randomlysampled fromtheNewLocation (NL/RS_3ducks
andNL/RS_5ducks)childrenshouldbelievethat theFrogmaynow
update his former false belief, inferring that the Duck box may have 
beenmovedtotheNewLocation.Moreover,thestrengthofchildren’s
inferences should depend, in a graded way, on the strength of evi-
dence they observe: they should be more confident that the Frog will 
change his mind when they see five ducks randomly drawn from the 
NewLocation(NL/RS_5ducks)thanwhentheyseethreeducks(NL/
RS_3ducks)randomlydrawn.
By contrast, selectively sampled evidence is uninformative about 
the population from which it is drawn. The experimenter can selec-
tively draw any sample at all (representative or non-representative)
from the population. Indeed, if the experimenter is trying to guaran-
tee that she gets three ducks in a row, she should sample selectively 
regardless of whether she is drawing from the population where ducks 
are relatively common (the Duck box) or the population where ducks 
are relatively rare (the Ball box). Since the selectively sampled evi-
dence is consistent with sampling from either box, a rational learner 
who integrates his prior beliefs with the data should retain his prior 
beliefs.That is,becauseboththeOldandNewLocationareconsis-
tent with the data and only the Old Location is consistent with the 
agent’s prior beliefs, we predict that children will expect the Frog to 
say the Duck box is in the Old Location in both the Old (OL/SS) and 
NewLocation(NL/SS)SelectiveSamplingconditions.
1.2 | Alternative accounts
In contrast to the pattern of responses consistent with third party 
rational inference (Table 1, row a), there are a number of other ways 
children might respond to the question ‘Where does Froggy think the 
Duckboxisnow?’Childrenmightrespondwiththeactuallocationof
TABLE  1 The predictions for the dominant response pattern if children expect other agents to engage in rational learning from data are 
listed in row a. The * indicates that the probability that children think the Frog will change his mind should depend on the strength of the 
evidencetheFrogobserves.Possiblealternativepatternsofresponsestothetestquestionineachofthefourconditions:NewLocation/
RandomSampling(NL/RS);NewLocation/SelectiveSampling(NL/SS);OldLocation/RandomSampling(OL/RS);OldLocation/Selective
Sampling(OL/SS).OLDindicatesthatthechildwouldpointtotheoriginallocationoftheDuckboxandNEWthatthechildwouldpointtothe
new location
Response pattern
New Location 
Random Sampling 
NL/RS
New Location  
Selective Sampling 
NL/SS
Old Location 
Random Sampling 
OL/RS
Old Location 
Selective Sampling 
OL/SS
a. Rational Learning NEW* OLD OLD OLD
b.Actuallocation(orchild’s
own beliefs) 
NEW NEW OLD OLD
c. F rog’s beliefs  
(without updating  
from data)
OLD OLD OLD OLD
d. S ampled data  
(without prior  
beliefs) 
NEW CHANCE OLD CHANCE
e.Random-Stay;
Selective-Shift
NEW OLD OLD NEW
f. Chance CHANCE CHANCE CHANCE CHANCE
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the Duck box; this is, after all, the location from which the Frog sees 
the ducks sampled, and also of course consistent with what the chil-
drenthemselvesbelieve(rowb,Table1).Alternatively,childrenmight
respond with the Frog’s true or false belief about the location of the 
Duck box, considering whether the Frog saw the boxes moved or not 
but without expecting Frog to update his beliefs given the sampled evi-
dence(rowc,Table1).Anotherpossibilityisthatchildrenmightexpect
the Frog to attend to the sampled evidence but not integrate it with his 
prior beliefs; they may conclude that if the Frog sees randomly sampled 
evidence he will strongly conclude that the Ducks are in that location, 
but if he sees selectively sampled evidence, he will recognize that the 
evidence is uninformative and choose at chance (row d, Table 1). Yet 
another possibility is that the children think the Frog will attend to the 
sampled evidence but not as a rational learner would; they might, for 
instance, think that Frog will conclude that random sampling indicates 
that the sample of ducks is pulled from the Duck box and that selective 
sampling of ducks means the sample is pulled from the Ball box (row 
e, Table 1). Finally, children might respond at chance, either because 
they genuinely believe that the Frog will guess or because different 
children choose different strategies and thus, as a group, generate 
responses indistinguishable from chance responding (row f, Table 1). 
CorrespondingtothequalitativepredictionsshowninTable1,Figure4
shows quantitative predictions for the rational inference account and 
each of the alternative accounts for all of the conditions in our study. 
The model predictions can be compared with children’s behavioral data.
In the experiment to follow, we test these different accounts and 
predict that children’s responses will be best explained as inferring 
that the Frog will rationally integrate his prior belief about the boxes’ 
locationswith the typeof samplingprocessheobserves.Note that
this specific pattern of responding requires children to track simul-
taneously the true location of the Duck box, the Frog’s belief about 
the location of the Duck box, and the probability of generating the 
observed sample from the population. The complexity of the task is 
necessary to distinguish children’s responding to a third party’s updat-
ing of his beliefs from responses children might make on other grounds 
(seeTable1).However,giventhecomplexityofthetask,weexpected
a number of children to have difficulty tracking the true location of the 
Duck box and the Frog’s beliefs about the boxes’ locations (especially 
as the boxes were occluded through much of the task and differed 
only in the relative proportion of their contents). Of course, children 
can only reason accurately about how the Frog might update his 
beliefs given the sample if they remember both the true location of the 
Duck box and the Frog’s beliefs about the location. Thus we made an 
a priori decision to focus our analysis on the responses of the children 
who successfully answered both check questions.
2  | METHOD
2.1 | Participants and materials
Two hundred six children (mean: 66months; range: 54–83months)
were recruited from an urban children’s museum and participated in 
the study. The testing occurred in three waves in the following order: 
NL/RS_3andNL/SS;OL/RSandOL/SS;NL/RS_5.Withineachwaveof
testing children were randomly assigned to condition. Testing contin-
ued until 30 children passed the check questions in each condition. (See 
Inclusion Questions to follow.) While most of the children were white 
and middle class, a range of ethnicities and socioeconomic  backgrounds 
reflectingthediversityoftheBostonmetropolitanarea(47%European
American,24.4%AfricanAmerican,8.9%Asian,17.5%Latino,3.9%two
ormoreraces)andthemuseumpopulation(29%ofmuseumattendees
receive free or discounted admission) were represented.
Two black cardboard boxes (30 cm3) were each separated into 
two sections by a cardboard barrier. The front side of both boxes was 
a clear plastic panel with a sheet of black felt velcroed over it. Each 
boxhadahand-sizedholeinthetop.Foronebox,referredtoasthe
‘Duckbox’,thefrontsectionwasfilledwith45rubberducksand15
ping-pongballs. For theotherbox, referred to as the ‘Ball box’, the
frontsectionwasfilledwith45ping-pongballsand15rubberducks.
(3:1 ratios were chosen because they are easily discriminable by pre-
schoolers and because three consecutive ducks are far more likely to 
be randomly sampled from the Duck box than the Ball box.) The back 
sections of both boxes also contained rubber ducks and ping-pong
balls, and were hidden from view. Each box was placed on a colored 
mat.AFrogpuppetservedastheagent.
2.2 | Design and procedure
We crossed the two locations where the Duck box could be at the 
endofthestudy(OldandNew)andtwokindsofsamplingprocesses,
sampling three ducks, from the Duck box (Random and Selective), 
yielding four conditions: the Old Location/Random Sampling (OL/
RS)condition,theNewLocation/RandomSampling(NL/RS_3ducks)
condition, the Old Location/Selective Sampling condition (OL/SS), and 
theNewLocation/SelectiveSampling(NL/SS)condition.Wealsoran
aconditionintheNewLocation/RandomSamplingcaseinwhichchil-
drensawasampleoffiveducksdrawnfromtheNewLocation(NL/
RS_5ducks).Weincludedthisconditiontoaskwhetherchildrendrew
graded inferences that depended on the amount of randomly gener-
ated data the Frog observes (i.e., children should be more likely to 
think the Frog might change his mind given more randomly sampled 
data inconsistent with his prior beliefs).
2.2.1 | Preference phase
In all conditions, the experimenter showed the child the Duck and 
Ball boxes side-by-side on a table (L/R counterbalanced across par-
ticipants). Each box was placed on a different colored mat, red or blue, 
to help children track the identities of the boxes. Initially, the felt hid 
the boxes’ front sections. Children were given a duck and a ball, not 
drawn from either box to hold briefly. The experimenter then lifted 
the felt, revealing the front sections of both boxes and said, ‘One box 
has mostly ducks, and one box has mostly balls. Which box has mostly 
ducks?Whichboxhasmostlyballs?’Ifthechildansweredincorrectly,
the experimenter told the child the correct answer and repeated the 
questions.
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Next, the experimenter introduced the agent, ‘Froggy’, saying,
‘This is my friend Froggy!’ The experimenter said, ‘Froggy likes ducks 
better than balls.’ The experimenter then asked the Frog if he wanted 
toplaywiththeball.TheFrogreplied,‘No,Ionlylikeducks!’Thechild
was asked to hand the Frog his favorite toy. The Frog’s preference 
for ducks was established to help children track the Frog’s goal of 
locatingtheDuckbox.Next,boththechildandtheFroglearnedthat
the boxes could move in two ways. The experimenter said, ‘The boxes 
can move so that they are in the same place’, and ‘The boxes can move 
so that they are in different places.’ (For the former, the experimenter 
rocked the boxes back and forth three times. For the latter, the exper-
imenter moved the Duck box from the red mat to the blue one and 
the Ball box from the blue mat to the red one, or vice versa; counter-
balanced across participants.) The experimenter then asked the Frog, 
‘Whichboxdoyoulikebest?’TheFrogapproachedtheDuckboxand
said, ‘I like this box! I like the Duck box!’ The experimenter returned 
the boxes to their original locations. The experimenter asked the child 
to point to the box the Frog preferred; all children answered correctly.
2.2.2 | Belief phase
Next,theexperimentertoldthechildthattheFrogwastiredandhid
himunderthetable.Childrenwatchedastheexperimenterre-covered
the front of both boxes with the felt. For children in the Old Location 
conditions, the experimenter rocked the boxes back and forth saying, 
‘I’m going to move the boxes so that they are in the same place.’ For 
childrenintheNewLocationconditions,theexperimenterswitched
the locations of the boxes saying, ‘I’m going to play a trick on Froggy! 
I’m going to move the boxes so that they are in different places.’
Inclusion questions
In both conditions, the experimenter then asked children two ques-
tions to check that they understood the true locations of the boxes 
(location check) and the Frog’s beliefs about the boxes (belief check). 
The location checkquestionwas,‘WhereistheDuckbox?’Thebelief 
checkquestionwas,‘WheredoesFroggythinktheDuckboxis?’
2.2.3 | Sampling phase
The experimenter brought the Frog back saying, ‘Look, Froggy is back!’ 
The experimenter asked the Frog to watch the two boxes and then 
respondedtoapretendphonecallsaying,‘Hello?Oh,youwantmeto
takethree(fiveintheNL/RS_5condition)ducksfromtheboxonthe
red(blue)mat?’(Theexperimenteralwaysnamedtheactuallocation
of the Duck box.) We included the phone call to dispel any impression 
that the experimenter was pedagogically sampling from the box in 
order to teach the Frog (or child) the actual location of the Duck box. 
Note that pedagogical sampling is always selective, but intentional
sampling can be either random or selective: one can intentionally pull 
objects out at random or intentionally choose particular objects (see 
e.g., Gweon et al., 2010, for discussion). In the Random Sampling con-
ditions, the experimenter looked over her shoulder (i.e., not into the 
box) and reached through the hole into the Duck box three times in 
rapid succession, drawing out a duck each time and counting out ‘One, 
two,three(four,five,onlyintheNL/RS_5condition)’.IntheSelective
Sampling conditions, the experimenter peered through the hole into 
the Duck box and kept her hand inside the box for approximately 
2 seconds before retrieving a duck. She counted, ‘One… two… three’ 
afterfindingeachduck.Aftersamplingthreeducksfromtheboxand
ending the pretend phone call, the experimenter asked, ‘Froggy, did 
youseethat?’towhichtheFrogreplied,‘Yes.’
2.2.4 | Test phase
In the final phase of the experiment after the sample of three ducks 
was drawn, children were asked the critical test question: ‘Where 
doesFroggythinktheDuckboxisnow?’
3  | RESULTS
3.1 | Inclusion questions
Children’s responses were coded from videotape by the first authors. 
Forty-seven percent of the data was coded by a second coder,
blind to condition and hypotheses. Inter-coder reliability was high
(Kappa=.95,98%agreement).
We coded children’s responses to the location (‘Where is the duck 
box?’)andbelief (‘WheredoesFroggythinktheduckboxis?’)check
questions.Ofthe206childrentested,73%(N = 150) answered both 
questions correctly (‘trackers’) and 27% (N = 56) answered one or
bothofthecheckquestions incorrectly (‘non-trackers’).Thenumber
of children excluded for failing only the location question, only the 
beliefquestionorbothbyconditionisasfollows:NL/RS_3:location:
6;belief:2;both:4;NL/RS_5: location:0;belief:7;both:8;NL/SS:
location:1;belief:12;both:4;OL/RS: location:4;belief:3;both:0;
OL/SS:location:1;belief:4;both:0.
Non-trackers were younger than trackers (non-trackers:
M = 64months; trackers: M = 67months; t(204)=2.52, p = .01, 
d = .39).Non-trackersmayhavesubsequentlygivenresponsesabout
the Frog’s belief that did not reflect information necessary to make 
accurate rational inferences on behalf of the Frog so we excluded 
these children from our primary analysis. This resulted in a final sample 
of N = 150(53%female1)childrenacrossthefiveconditions:NL/RS_3
(n = 30, mage=65mo.;range:54–78months),NL/SS(n = 30, mage=66
mo.; range: 54–82months), OL/RS (n = 30, mage =66 mo.; range: 
54–81months),OL/SS(n = 30, mage=68mo.;range:55–82months),
and NL/RS_5 (n = 30, mage=69 mo.; range: 57–83months). Age in
months did not differ across conditions (F(4,145)=1.05,p = .38).
NotethatmorechildrenfailedtheinclusionquestionsintheNew
Location condition than the Old Location condition (unsurprisingly 
sincetheNewLocationconditioninvolvedtrackingbothachangeof
locationandrepresentingafalsebelief).Onaverage,8.67morechil-
dren were excluded for failure to track the boxes’ locations and/or the 
Frog’sbeliefsinthethreeNewLocationconditionsthanthetwoOld
Locationconditions(a33%exclusionrateversusa17%exclusionrate;
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p = .01). This raises the possibility that the included sample of children 
intheNewLocationmightdifferfromthoseintheOldLocationcon-
dition in any of a number of ways (e.g., including being more attentive 
or motivated, having better theory of mind or executive function skills, 
or differing with respect to other cognitive abilities).
Critically, however, the rational learning account does not predict 
better, or even simply uniformly different performance in the New
Location conditions than the Old Location conditions (predictions 
whose investigation could be confounded to the degree that one 
group of children met more stringent inclusion criteria than the other). 
Rather, it predicts a precise pattern of responses depending jointly 
on the Frog’s initial beliefs about the boxes’ location, the sampling 
process, and the amount of evidence observed. That is, this account 
makes predictions within each condition (where there are no differ-
ences in exclusion rates) and also predicts both commonalities and 
differencesacrossconditions.Neitherthepredictionthat,withineach
condition, children should be more likely to expect the Frog’s beliefs 
to be informed by randomly than selectively sampled evidence, nor the 
prediction that children should draw stronger inferences for the Old 
thantheNewLocationconditiongivenrandomly(butnotselectively)
generated evidence, can be accounted for by an overall difference 
between the two conditions.
3.2 | Test question
Because we had a priori hypotheses about the pattern of results, we 
performed planned linear contrasts. We formalized the prediction 
thattheresponsesintheNewLocation/RandomSamplingconditions
would differ from the other three conditions, and that the other 
three conditions would not differ from each other by conducting the 
analyses with following weights: New Location/Random Sampling
withthreeducks(3),theNewLocation/SelectiveSampling(−2),the
Old Location/ Random Sampling (−2), the Old Location/Selective
Sampling (−2), and the New Location/Random sampling with five
ducks (3).
For the 150 children who recalled the Frog’s belief as well as 
the boxes’ actual locations, the linear contrast was significant (F(1, 
149)=19.54, p < .001, η2 = .35). Children were significantly more 
likely to believe that the Frog had updated his belief to the New
Location in theNew Location/Random Sampling conditions than in
theotherconditions (percentageofchildrenchoosingNewLocation
bycondition:NL/RS_3:63%;NL/RS_5:77%;NL/SS:13%;OL/RS:3%;
OL/SS:27%;seeFigure2).
By contrast, for the children who answered at least one of the 
check questions incorrectly (the non-trackers), the linear contrast
was not significant (F(1,55)=1.78,p = .15, η2 = .12). Instead, children 
appeared to either respond at chance or respond to the last location 
where they had seen the ducks (see Figure 3). Crucially, these results 
suggest that the children who met the inclusion criteria were not sim-
ply defaulting to some baseline response pattern but were instead 
responding as predicted: inferring that the Frog would rationally 
update his beliefs from the data.
We restrict our analyses to children who pass the inclusion criteria 
because there is no clear way to interpret the responses of children 
who lost track of the boxes’ location or failed to represent the Frog’s 
initialbeliefs.However,thelinearcontrastremainssignificantifall206
F IGURE  3 Proportionofchildrenwhofailedtheinclusioncriteria
(‘non-trackers’)whochosetheNewLocationineachconditionin
response to the test question about the Frog’s belief
Linear Contrast: F(1, 55) = 1.78, p = .15, η2 = .12
F IGURE  2 Proportionofchildrenwhopassedtheinclusion
criteria(‘trackers’)whochosetheNewlocationineachconditionin
response to the test question about the Frog’s belief
Linear Contrast: F(1, 149) = 19.54, p < .001, η2 = .35
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children are included (F(1,205)=10.314,p < .001, η2 = .22), suggest-
ing that the results are robust to the exclusion criteria.
Looking within each condition, children chose the Old Location 
significantly more often than chance in all conditions (percentage of 
childrenchoosingOldLocation:NL/SS:87%,p < .001;OL/RS:97%,
p < .001;OL/SS:73%,p = .02;bybinomialtest)excepttheNL/RS_5
conditionwheretheychosetheNewLocationabovechance(77%of
childrenchoosingNew;p = .005bybinomial test) and theNL/RS_3
conditionwheretheychoseatchance(63%ofchildrenchoosingNew;
p = .20 by binomial test).
TABLE  2 Bayes factor analyses comparing the Rational Learning model with the alternative models
Correct Location Prior Belief Random- Stay/Selective- Shift Sampled Data Chance
Rational Learning: 33.73: 1 42.98:1 26.32:1 45.80:1 146.20:1
F IGURE  4 Predictionsmadebythe
Rational Learning Model for the rational 
inference model along with the five 
alternative models (b–f). The Rational 
Learning Model (a) provides the best fit to 
the children’s responses. (See Figure 2 and 
Table 1.)
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Our hypothesis made several key predictions about differences 
between conditions. First, if children expect the Frog to be sensitive 
to the distinction between randomly sampled and selectively sampled 
evidence, then given the same prior beliefs and evidence, they should 
expect the Frog to draw stronger inferences from randomly sampled 
evidence than selectively sampled evidence. Children’s inferences did 
indeed depend on the type of evidence sampled. In the comparison 
between the New Location/Random Sampling_3 condition and the
NewLocation/SelectiveSamplingconditionchildrenweremore likely
to update the Frog’s false belief and infer that the Duck box was in the 
NewLocationintheRandomSamplingthantheSelectiveSamplingcon-
dition, as warranted (Fisher’s exact, p < . 001). Similarly, children were 
more likely to think the Frog would infer that the Duck box was in the 
Old Location in the Old Location/Random Sampling condition com-
pared to the Old Location/Selective Sampling condition (Fisher’s exact, 
p = .03). The fact that children made comparable inferences in both con-
ditions suggests that the results cannot be explained by differences in 
children’s belief understanding in the two conditions (i.e., as a byproduct 
ofthedifferentinclusionratesintheNewandOldLocationconditions).
Rather, children’s tendency to expect the Frog’s beliefs to be more 
influenced by randomly sampled than selectively sampled evidence in 
both conditions is consistent with the Rational Learning account since, 
indeed, randomly sampled evidence is more informative than selectively 
sampled evidence about the population from which it is drawn.
Alsoaspredicted,numericallymorechildrensaidtheFrogwould
update his belief when five ducks were randomly sampled than 
when three ducks were randomly sampled. The difference between 
theNL/RS_3conditionandNL/RS_5conditionwasnotsignificant
(Fisher’s exact, p = .40); however, the graded nature of children’s
inferences was consistent with the predictions of the rational infer-
ence model.2
Finally, as predicted, children were sensitive to the Frog’s prior 
beliefs. Given identical evidence and sampling processes, children 
drew different inferences when the data were sampled from the Old 
Location and the New Location. Thus given three ducks randomly
sampled from a location, children’s inferences about what he would 
learn from the sample depended on the Frog’s prior beliefs about the 
location of the Duck box. Children were confident that the Frog would 
believe the randomly sampled data indicating that the Duck box was 
intheoldlocation(97%ofchildrenintheOL/RSchoseOld)butdid
not make as strong an inference when the randomly sampled data 
suggestedtheDuckboxwasintheNewLocation(63%ofchildrenin
theNL/RS_3choseNew;OL/RSvs.NL/RS_3,Fisher’sexact,p = .002). 
The analogous comparison between the selective sampling conditions 
was also significant. The Rational Learning model predicts that  children 
should choose the Old Location in both selective sampling conditions 
because selective sampling is uninformative about the population 
fromwhich it is drawn.As predicted, children interpreted identical
evidence differently depending on the Frog’s prior beliefs about the 
location: children were more likely to choose the Old Location in the 
OL/SScondition(73%)thantheyweretochoosetheNewLocationin
theNL/SScondition(13%;Fisher’sexact,p < .001).
Asa further testof thehypothesis that children’s judgmentson
behalf of the Frog reflect an expectation of rational learning, rather 
than any alternative model (Table 1) we can directly compare the 
Rational Learning model with alternative models using a Bayes factor 
analyses(seeGelmanetal.,2013).AsisclearinTable2andFigure4,
the Rational Learning Model outperforms all of the alternative models 
inpredictingthedata.SeeAppendixS1fordetails.
Finally, we looked at whether the ability to make the rational infer-
enceonbehalfoftheFrogchangedbetweenfour-and-a-halfandsix
years. We coded children’s responses as a ‘1’ if they responded with 
the Old Location in the Old Location/Random Sampling, Old Location/
SelectiveSampling,andNewLocation/SelectiveSamplingconditions
andwith theNewLocation in theNewLocation/RandomSampling
conditions and a ‘0’ if they responded otherwise. The logistic regres-
sion was marginally significant, suggesting a trend for older children 
to be more likely to expect others to rationally update their beliefs, 
β =0.043(.024),z = 1.791,p = .073. See Figure 5.
4  | DISCUSSION
The results of the current study suggest that young children not only 
expect agents to act rationally with respect to their goals (Gergely & 
Csibra, 2003), they expect other agents to learn rationally from data. 
To make inferences on behalf of another agent, children needed 
to integrate the agent’s prior beliefs with the evidence the agent 
observed and the way the evidence was sampled. Children were 
inclined to believe that the Frog would change his mind only when 
there was strong evidence against the Frog’s prior belief (i.e., in the 
NewLocation/RandomSamplingconditions).Childrendidnotexpect
F IGURE  5 Children’s responses were coded as 1 if they were 
consistent with the expectation of rational learning and 0 otherwise. 
Therewasanon-significanttrendforchildren’sperformanceto
improve with age
Logistic Regression: β = 0.043(.024), z = 1.791, p = .073
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the Frog to change his mind when the evidence was consistent with 
his prior beliefs (Old Location/Random Sampling; New Location/
Selective Sampling), or when the evidence may have conflicted with 
the Frog’s prior beliefs but was weak and thus provided little ground 
for belief revision (Old Location/Selective Sampling).
Althougheven theyoungest children inour samplewere able to
draw inferences about how a third party would update his beliefs from 
data, this study provides suggestive evidence that this ability might 
increase with age. Future research might look both at how children’s 
ability to draw inferences about others’ learning changes over develop-
ment and investigate the origins of this sensitivity earlier in childhood. 
Abasicunderstandingofhowevidenceaffectsothers’beliefs(e.g.,the
understanding that seeing leads to knowing; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; 
Pratt&Bryant1990;Senju,Southgate,Snape,Leonard,&Csibra,2011)
emerges very early. This knowledge, together with the ability to make 
predictions about rational action, opens up the possibility that in simpler 
contexts, even younger children might be able to draw inferences about 
how third parties might update their beliefs from data. It is also possi-
ble that children’s representations of the processes that underlie belief 
revision may support the emergence of broader abilities in interpretive 
theoryofmind(Astingtonetal.,2002;Carey&Smith,1993,Chandler
&Carpendale,1998;LaLonde&Chandler,2002;Myers&Liben,2012;
Pillow&Mash,1999;Rossetal.,2005;Ruffmanetal.,1993); future
research might investigate the relationship between understanding that 
evidence conflicts with prior knowledge and understanding that evi-
dence can be ambiguous depending on prior knowledge.
As discussed, children might have made awide range of other
inferences. In particular, they might have assumed that the Frog’s 
beliefs would mirror their own; they might have recognized that the 
Frog’s beliefs depended on epistemic access to the location of the box 
but failed to recognize that the Frog might update his beliefs based on 
inferential evidence, or they might have expected the Frog to attend 
to the sampled evidence but not have expected the Frog to integrate 
this evidence with his prior beliefs. Yet, children in this study were able 
to make predictions about what the Frog would think about the loca-
tion of the Duck box given the evidence, even though they themselves 
always knew the true location of the Duck box. Moreover, children 
were able to draw different inferences depending on the ambiguity of 
the evidence, showing different patterns of responding in the Random 
and Selective Sampling conditions. This suggests that children can 
draw inferences that are sensitive both to the distinction between 
their own and others’ prior knowledge, and to the strength of the 
data that others observe. We believe this finding is broadly consis-
tent with an emerging body of literature suggesting that children make 
relatively nuanced decisions about when and what to learn from oth-
ers(Bonawitzetal.,2011;Corriveau,Fusaro,&Harris,2009;Gweon,
Pelton,Konopka,&Schulz,2014;Jaswal,2010;Jaswal,Croft,Setia,&
Cole,2010;Koenig,Clement,&Harris,2004;Koenig&Harris,2005;
Stiller, Goodman, & Frank, 2015). Our study extends the literature by 
suggesting that children also make relatively nuanced decisions about 
how and when children will expect others to learn.
The current study, however, does not indicate how broadly 
this ability extends, nor does it suggest the conditions under which 
children might fail to expect others to rationally update their beliefs 
fromdata.Herewesuggestanaccountofhowchildrenmightmake
normative judgments on behalf of third parties; future research might 
test the limitations of this account. Also, as discussed, the current
study was motivated in part by predictions from an ideal observer 
model of rational inference. The results are broadly consistent with 
thataccount.However,providinga rigorous testof thequantitative
predictions of the rational inference model and alternative accounts 
remains an important direction for future work.
Asadults,weexpectotheragentstoberationalactorsnotonlyin
terms of the paths they take towards their goals, but also in terms of 
howtheyreasonaboutevidence.Herewefindthatchildren’sdevelop-
ingtheoryofmindsupportsthesamekindsofinferences.By4½years,
children are able to integrate others’ prior knowledge and observed 
evidence to support predictions about when others will retain their 
beliefs and when they will change their minds.
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NOTES
1 Informationonthechildren’sgenderwasavailableonlyfor81%ofthechil-
dren;thereportedpercentagereflectsthissub-sample.
2Notethatalthoughagesdidnotdiffersignificantlyacrossconditions,the
meanageofchildrenintheNL/RS_5conditionwas69months,compared
to65monthsforchildrenintheNL/RS_3condition.Wearegratefultoan
anonymous reviewer for pointing out the possibility that this age difference 
may have contributed to children’s stronger inferences in the NL/RS_5
condition.
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APPENDIX 
Computational Model
To help clarify our proposal and specify what counts as ‘rational in-
ference’ in these contexts, we developed a computational model that 
provides quantitative predictions for each experimental condition. 
The model specifies how a rational agent would behave when pre-
sentedwiththesametaskthatwegaveourparticipants.Although
many studies have used Bayesian models to assess children’s ability 
to update their own prior beliefs from data (see Gopnik & Wellman, 
2012; Schulz, 2012; and Tenenbaum et al., 2011, for reviews) to our 
knowledge, this is the first attempt to consider children’s ability to 
predict when another agent will (or will not) change his mind by con-
sidering both that agent’s access to the data and his prior beliefs. 
Finally, note that in suggesting that children’s rational inferences on 
behalf of a third party can be captured by a Bayesian inference 
model, we do not mean to suggest that children have conscious, 
meta-cognitive access to these computations; rather, we suggest
that such sophisticated computations may underlie the many im-
plicit, rapid, accurate judgments that support everyday social cogni-
tion.Figure4intheMainTextdisplaysthepredictionsofourmodel
for each of the candidate hypotheses of Table 1 in the Main Text.
The model is specified at two levels. First, we built a model of the 
Frog as a rational learner, given the information that he has available 
to him. Then, we modeled children’s rational inferences about the 
Frog. Thus two levels of rational inference are represented: the Frog’s 
beliefs about the location of the box, and the child’s beliefs about the 
Frog’s beliefs.
We adopt a Bayesian framework for modeling both these levels of 
rational inference. Bayesian inference models a learning event as an 
interaction of two factors: the agent’s prior beliefs about a hypothesis, 
before seeing new data: p(h), and the probability that the hypothesis is 
true given the newly observed data, the likelihood p(D | h). These com-
bine to yield the agent’s updated posterior belief p(h | D). Given new 
data bearing on a hypothesis, Bayes’ rule specifies how a rational 
agent should update her beliefs as:
We now turn to the model of the Frog’s inference, from the per-
spective of an ideal observer (which we can consider the child as 
approximating). On each experimental trial, the experimenter draws 
ducks from the Duck box, either randomly or selectively, and the 
boxesmayormaynothavebeenswitched.At thatpoint,both the
child and the Frog know whether the sample is drawn randomly or 
selectively but only the child knows whether the boxes have been 
switched. However, the Frog has some prior belief pswitch about 
whether the boxes were switched in his absence (given the demon-
stration that they can be switched), which is equivalent to having a 
prior belief about which box the ducks are being drawn from. We can 
specify these as p(hduck) = pswitch for the Duck box and 
p(hball)=1−pswitch for the Ball box. The Frog must integrate this 
prior belief with his observation of three (or five) ducks being drawn 
from the box. Under random sampling, the probability of drawing n 
ducks and zero balls, with replacement,1 from the duck box is 
hduck=
(
45
60
)n
=
(
3
4
)n
; similarly the probability of drawing n ducks from 
the ball box is hball=
(
1
4
)n
 (these quantities specify the likelihood of 
the data given each hypothesis). Under selective sampling, the experi-
menter explicitly reached into the box to pull out a duck and thus the 
probability is 1 from each box. The posterior beliefs p(hduck | D) and 
p(hball | D) are then given by Bayes’ theorem above:
in the case of random sampling, and
in the case of selective sampling.
Thus we have a posterior distribution over the two hypotheses, 
where the posterior probability that the sample is drawn from the 
Duck box increases as the number of randomly sampled ducks 
increases, and remains equal to the prior under selective sampling. This 
reflects our intuition that the evidence is stronger with each new ran-
domly sampled duck and unchanged with each selectively sampled 
duck.
HavingspecifiedarationalmodeloftheFrog’sinference,wenow
describe our model of the experimental participants. We propose 
that children can approximately simulate the above inference, and 
when asked to say where they think the Frog thinks the duck box is, 
they report the output of this computation, subject to two approxi-
mations.Asisstandardpracticewhenmodelingbehavioralresponses
(Denison, Bonawitz, Gopnik, & Griffiths, 2013; Gweon et al., 2010; 
Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007), we assume that children probability match; 
that is, the frequency with which they select responses is propor-
tional to the posterior probability of each hypothesis. In a population 
of participants, this rule gives a distribution of responses that mimics 
the distribution of posterior beliefs, and it is an efficient scheme for 
approximating probabilistic inference (Vul, Goodman, Griffiths, &
Tenenbaum, 2014).We also consider the possibility that on each
trial, there is a nonzero probability that children may have been 
 inattentive or confused. We therefore include a noisy response 
parameter, perror, estimating the probability that a participant gives a 
box choice selected uniformly at random, instead of the response 
predicted by the model. Thus our model at this point has two param-
eters: the Frog’s prior belief, p_switch, about whether the boxes were 
switched, and the noisy response parameter, p_error. To estimate 
pswitch, we used the ratio of children’s responses on the initial belief 
question:
We have no analogous way to derive a plausible independent and 
numerically precise estimate of perror. For the results displayed in 
Figure4, we set perror = .25; as children had to pass two inclusion 
checks,atmost25%ofincludedchildrencouldhavebeenansweringat
chance.
p(h|D)∝p(D|h)p(h)
(1)p(hduck|D)∝pswitch×
(
3
4
)n
and p(hball|D)∝pswitch×
(
1
4
)
(2)p(hduck|D)∝pswitch and p(hball|D)∝pswitch
pswitch=
28
178
= .157
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While we have described our model mathematically, it is possible to 
implement this model implicitly by simple sampling operations, with-
out making any explicit statistical calculations. We describe one such 
implementation written in the probabilistic programming language 
Church(Goodman,Mansinghka,Roy,Bonawitz,&Tenenbaum,2008;
Goodman&Tenenbaum,2014).
We implemented the Rational Learning model, and all of the alterna-
tive models presented in Table 1 in the probabilistic programming lan-
guageChurch(Goodmanetal.,2008;Goodman&Tenenbaum,2014).
We used the webchurch implementation, available at https://github.
com/probmods/webchurch or interactively at https://probmods.org/
play-space.html. To evaluate the following Church code, copy and
paste the code text into the environment available in the latter link.
The following code block is sufficient to reproduce all of the model 
predictions described here; to obtain the predictions for individual 
conditionsgivenaspecifiedmodel,modifythevariablesnum-draws,
actual-switch,andsampling-mannerasdescribedinthetext.Toobtain
the predictions of different (alternative) models, the predictions of the 
different(alternative)models(a)-(f),modifythevalueofthevariable
which-modeltotheappropriate‘a-’finthecodelistedinDataS1.
APPENDIX NOTE
1 While the experiment used sampling without replacement, our model 
used sampling with replacement because the analysis is conceptually 
simpler and for largepopulations (i.e., the60objects in theboxhere)
the difference between the distributions underlying sampling with and 
without replacement is negligible.
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